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ABSTRACT
Current threat models typically consider all possible ways an at-
tacker can penetrate a system and assign probabilities to each path
according to some metric (e.g. time-to-compromise). In this paper
we discuss how this view hinders the realness of both technical
(e.g. attack graphs) and strategic (e.g. game theory) approaches
of current threat modeling, and propose to steer away by looking
more carefully at attack characteristics and attacker environment.
We use a toy threat model for ICS attacks to show how a realistic
view of attack instances can emerge from a simple analysis of attack
phases and attacker limitations.
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1 THREAT MODELING: INTRODUCTION
AND BACKGROUND
The importance of threat modelling in the assessment of one’s
security posture is underlined by the numerous academic [18, 26,
33, 45], commercial [27], and standardized approaches [14, 20, 39]
reported in the literature. In general, two broad categories for threat
modelling can be identified in the literature:
1) Vulnerability and technical exposure. System vulnerabilities
can be exploited by attackers to obtain unauthorized access to a
system. The notion of ‘attack surface’ [26] reproduces the entry
points of the attacker to then compute a metric of ‘exposure’ to
attacks. The paths that an attacker can follow to reach a specific
system or resource can be modeled through ‘attack graphs’, where
each node is a vulnerability on a system, and edges represent the
attacker’s possibility to ‘escalate’ to the next system [45]. These
graph often tend to explode as network size grows, making the iden-
tification of realistic paths to compromise difficult to achieve [31].
In all approaches, the vulnerability plays a central role in the threat
modeling: for example, the probability of traversing an attack graph
alongside a certain path is typically computed as a function of some
measurement of each vulnerability.
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2) Strategic approaches. A different perspective is adopted by
models that account for attacker strategies, often in response to a
defensive posture by their target [33]. These models are typically
specified using classic game-theory, and solved looking for specific
equilibria: for example, Nash solutions assume that each player
(attacker and defender) aims at maximizing his/her own outcome
irrespective of the choice of the other player (accounting instead
for the possible decisions he/she may make); Stackelberg security
games assume instead that the attacker’s decision depends on the
observation of the defender’s strategy. The model solutions often-
times assume that ‘all attackers look alike’ [2] or that players act
over perfect information [21]. These assumptions also underlie re-
cent linear-programming solutions to the defender’s problem [35],
where the attacker is implicitly assumed to be all-knowing with
respect to the vulnerabilities on the system.
Despite the diversity in the adopted perspective or application
scenario, all current approaches have an underlying assumption
in common: the attacker can arbitrarily choose whichever attack
vector or sequence he/she thinks will maximize the function the model
assigns to him or her. For example, attack graphs enumerate all pos-
sible (known) vulnerabilities that the attacker may exploit; game
theoretic approaches assume the attacker can choose whichever
attack strategy he/she believes best, irrespective of the solution
strategy; NIST 800-30 directives require the assessors to look at
all possible attack paths toward an asset. This of course puts the
defender at high strain as he/she needs to defend against all vulner-
abilities (ranging in the thousands [1]), whereas the attacker only
need one or a few, and can choose any.
2 EMPIRICAL VIEWS ON ATTACKS
Recent empirical findings, replicated independently over a num-
ber of studies, present results in sharp contrast with the general
assumption that attackers may exploit any available vulnerability.
Whereas from this threat model one would expect exploits to appear
in attack signatures and network telemetries at comparable rates
(i.e. ideally, uniformly), the empirical observation iswidely different:
out of tens of thousands of possible vulnerabilities only a fraction
is actively exploited in the wild (even after controlling for observa-
tional biases) [8]. This effect is even stronger when looking at the
actual volumes of attacks driven by each (exploited) vulnerability,
for which we observe heavy tail distributions of attacks [4, 29]. This
effect also emerges for so-called 0-day vulnerabilities, i.e. vulnera-
bilities known to attackers before vendors have an opportunity to
fix them [13]: over an historical record of attacks worldwide, Bilge
and Dumitras find only less than twenty 0-days, of which two cu-
mulatively carry two million attacks, and the remaining constitute
negligible background noise five orders of magnitude lower.
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The figures remain similar by looking at the exploits attackers
trade in the black markets: exploit kits drive millions of attacks [22,
32, 41], yet they embed five to ten exploits each at a maximum [25],
a figure settled around 3-4 exploits per kit in recent years [3, 5]. At
the same time, the vast majority of attacks in the wild are carried by
this handful of vulnerabilities only [8, 12], and the refresh time of
attacks in the wild is as slow at 600 days (i.e. the same exploits are
re-used in the wild for almost two years before they are substituted
at scale with a new attack) [11]. Similarly, attacks against Industrial
Control Systems like SCADA, Distributed Control Systems, and
PLCs, that form the skeleton of the critical infrastructure, seem to
be relatively rare. While the severity of these attacks, especially
when perpetrated at a national or infrastructural level, is certainly
high, ICS incidents seem to affect a very limited fraction of the
overall vulnerable infrastructure [16, 27].
The present empirical view on attack distributions can not,
clearly, justify the assumption that attackers will choose any vul-
nerability among those available to deliver their attack. Even if
systems remained vulnerable at non-uniform rates (which appears
not to be the case [28]), one would expect the overall distribution
of attacks to ‘spike’ for vulnerabilities preferred by attackers (e.g.
those that get patched at a slower rate than the average), not for all
vulnerabilities to be collapsed several orders of magnitude below
the preferred set, a phenomenon all available data clearly shows [9].
This is clearly unacceptable because the defender needs to decide
which vulnerabilities to fix first, and it becomes therefore critical
to identify which vulnerabilities are most likely to drive orders of
magnitude more attacks than the rest.
3 ATTACK GENERATION
It remains therefore an open question to identify the ‘attack gener-
ation process’ that out of thousands of vulnerabilities selects only
a small fraction that will deliver the vast majority of attacks. This
is reflected in recent work, carried independently by other authors,
questioning the soundness of current attacker assumptions [37], in
particular in the ‘hunting’ of game-theoretic solutions that attack-
ers operate under complete information, and act rationally in their
decision process. In related work in the cognitive sciences, Veksler
showed that, depending on the payoff matrix, game theoretic so-
lutions to the attacker’s mixed strategy may lead the attacker to
lose in 50% of the scenarios, i.e. the attacker is indifferent to the
choice and randomly picks an attack strategy [44]. On this same
line, Abbasi et al. conclude that a ‘homogeneous’ distribution of at-
tackers can not be assumed when solving for equilibrium solutions
to a game theoretic model [2]. Overall, one can broadly distinguish
between ‘commodified’ and ‘tailored’ attacks as threat sources:
1) Commodified attacks are generated by some pre-existing at-
tack mechanism that is available to the attacker through the envi-
ronment in which he or she operates. These report the vast majority
of attacks [12, 29, 32]. For example, an attacker may buy an exploit
kit from the underground cybercrime markets [5, 6, 22], or a mem-
ber of the self-proclaimed hacktivist organization Anonymous may
largely use a pre-engineered tool to launch a distributed denial of
service attack. Importantly, the update rate of these attacks is not
realistically driven by the state of any specific target, but rather
by the state of the population of possible targets: for example, an
exploit kit gets realistically updated when the overall efficacy of
the exploit it embeds drops below a certain (commercially viable)
threshold [11] (corresponding to the well-known economic process
of ‘inaction’ first formalized by Stokey in 2008 [38]);
2) Tailored attacks are attacks that are carried against a specific
target or a specific set of targets. These require some level of engi-
neering or technical sophistication on top of the mere deployment
of the attack on the side of the attacker. For example an attacker
may need to modify an exploit to fit the specific environment of
the target system, or engineer a new attack altogether after finding
that none of the attacks in his/her possession matches an existing
vulnerability [10]. Importantly, in these scenarios the attacker often
acts under severe uncertainty in the topology, structure, and char-
acteristics of the attacked network, which makes the identification
of a ‘one-size-fit-all’ attack strategy impossible to achieve [34].
The former class of attacks has been recently covered in a number
of papers highlighting the mismatch between empirical observa-
tions and attacker assumptions [10, 11, 29, 37]. ‘Tailored’ attacks
are however less investigated, on the one hand because much less
common than ‘commodified’ attacks [43], and on the other because
a clear rationalization of attacker characteristics remains uncer-
tain [23]. For example, multi-stage attacks where the attacker needs
to overcome a set of perimetral defenses to breach a network and
then target an attack once the ‘internal’ systems are revealed may
require significant efforts in terms of reconnaissance and exploit
engineering. This process may take several weeks or months to com-
plete: whereas time-to-compromise is often proposed as a metric to
evaluate ‘likelihood’ of attack [24, 30], it remains unclear at what
level of the attacker strategy this has an effect. For example, a tar-
geted (‘tailored’) attack against a governmental facility perpetrated
by political activists requires a specific timing to maximize media
coverage (e.g. close to the approval of a controversial law); similarly,
espionage requires an attack to be completed before the target se-
cret loses tangible value for the attacker (e.g. classified information
affecting stock value of an organization), or a small criminal organi-
zation may not have the resources to dedicate months in finalizing
an attack against an ICS system.
These effects should be accounted for in the same fashion K.
Shortridge [37] covers in her work: by considering the attacker’s
ability to learn during the attack, the set of information he/she
possesses before launching the attack, and his/her risk aversion to,
for example, failing the attack (much like adversarial modeling in
terrorism contexts prescribes [19]).
3.1 An example on a typical ICS system
Figure 1, drawn from NIST Special Publication 800-82 on ICS se-
curity [40], shows a typical multi-level ICS network whereby a
control center communicates over one or many network layers
with field sites where PLCs, specialized controllers, and sensors are
typically located. In this structure, the systems in the control cen-
ter are typically ‘regular Windows systems’[36] enabling SCADA
control functionalities; these systems are ideally ‘air-gapped’ [40]
(i.e. do not have any physical connection with other networks),
but in practice they are often exposed to the open Internet to ease
network management; the operation network is in the best case a
VPN connecting the control systems to the peripheral devices. The
Figure 1: Typical two-level ICS configuration. Picture taken
from NIST Special Publication 800-82 [40].
systems in the field sites are ultimately the real target of an attack
as they are the ones that cause the impact in the physical world (e.g.
accelerating a turbine, shutting off a power generator, etc.) [43].
Following indications from the ICS-CERT,1 this setup forces
the attacker to structure his attack in three stages, as follows: (1)
Penetrate the first control center layer; (2) Analyze the internals of
the target system; (3) Strike the target system(s).
A typical attack scenario involves a watering hole attack, or a
targeted phishing email, to penetrate the first layers of the control
center. In this stage the attacker can use a ‘commodified’ set of
attacks to gain control over what is, from a vulnerability perspective,
a regular (hopefully hardened) Windows system. The actual control
systems may require additional effort to be reached once inside (e.g.
because of network segregation) [17]. From here, extensive levels
of reconnaissance are typically needed to (1) identify the network
and system configuration visible from the first attack stage, and (2)
understand which attacks are needed to move to the next phase.
For example, Kim Zetter’s coverage of the Ukrainian Power grid
attack [17] summarizes:2
The initial intrusion got the attackers only as far as
the corporate networks. But they still had to get to
the SCADA networks that controlled the grid [..] so
the attackers were left with two options: either find
vulnerabilities that would let them punch through the
firewalls or find another way to get in. [..] Over many
months they conducted extensive reconnaissance, ex-
ploring and mapping the networks and getting access
to the Windows Domain Controllers [..] Once they
got into the SCADA networks, they slowly set the
stage for their attack.
3.1.1 Toy model of a ‘tailored’ attack. Let us then consider an
attacker that values the potential overall havoc that can be inflicted
to the SCADA infrastructure as V . A certain fraction α of V can
be extracted from the first-phase attack (for example by spreading
ransomware or by defacing a public server). As the first stage can
be aided by commodified attacks, we assume the attacker succeeds
with probability 1 [7, 25]. The payoff for the first phase is:
Π1 = αV −C1 (1)
whereC1 is the cost of performing the attack (e.g. to buy the exploit).
From the newly acquired position the attacker may start perform-
ing some level of reconnaissance on the internal network (stage
1https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/overview-cyber-vulnerabilities.
2https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/
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Figure 2: Numerical simulation of phase-one and phase-two
attacks. p = 0.8,V = 1000,δ = 0.8,C1 = 0.1 ×V ,C2 = 2 ×C1.
2), including the identification of other subnets, bridge systems
to the SCADA control network, and/or the topology of the ICS
network (see Fig. 1). Let us denote with p2 the overall probability
that the attacker successfully accomplishes this phase. Then, with
probability p2 the attacker extracts the remaining fraction of V , i.e.
(1− α)V and pays an upfront costC2 for completing phase-two. As
discussed above, an attacker may wish to finalize the attack within
a specific timeframe, e.g. because of limited resources to commit
for prolonged attacks. The overall value of phase-two is discounted
by a factor e−δ t . We therefore set the two-phase attack profit as:
Π2 = αV −C1 + p2 [(1 − α)V ] e−δ t −C2 (2)
Figure 2 reports a numerical simulation of the two models. Neg-
ative payoffs indicate areas where the attacker will not act. As
one can see, the value of a two-phase attack quickly decays as
T increases (as limt→∞ Π2 = Π1 − C2), and the rate of decrease
increases as α grows. This reflects the intuition that a two-phase
attack quickly loses of appeal as time passes, and as the value that
can be extracted from a phase-one attack increases.
3.1.2 Take-aways. From the example analysis above it emerges
that attackers in the second phase will only materialize in the in-
dicated area under the curve in Fig. 2: for example, hacktivists
and other low-resource attackers will largely disregard phase-two
attacks (which quickly lose of appeal as too many resources and
time likely need be dedicated to complete the second phase), and
focus instead on standard internet-facing systems, which appears
indeed to be the case for most attacks of this type [15, 42]. For
example, infecting an organization’s network with ransomware
may be enough to cause the desired level of havoc, or a website
defacement enough to reach the desired audience (e.g. the organi-
zation’s customers) [42]. The appeal of stage two attacks decreases
the lower their overall impact on the targeted infrastructure is (i.e.
as α → 1). Differently, nation-state or powerful attackers may have
the adequate resource set to endeavour in the second-stage attack,
i.e. because they have a set of ready-to-use SCADA exploits, or
they have a discount factor close to zero (i.e. they have resources
to commit to the attack for long periods of time).
Under this model, the appearance of a new vulnerability in an
ICS system carries little weight on the overall risk scenario, as
most attackers would not be able to exploit it (unless commodified).
Reasoning about the attacker’s ability to learn at every stage of the
attacker can help in setting parameters of the model to realistic
values and, critically, in understanding the correct shape of the
learning function of the attacker. The presence of multiple attackers,
or collusion of attackers with insiders, may be considered in the
model as well, in the same fashion as terrorist cells are modeled in
the risk analysis literature [19].
Importantly, in this model we are assuming that the value V of
the attacked infrastructure is determined exogenously; in reality,
attackers may adjustV depending on their own specific interest. In
this simple model, α represents the mechanism that associates the
value assigned by the attacker to the first stage attack. For example,
a human rights hacktivist may be reluctant to exfiltrate private
costumer data, and assign a high value to the defacement of public
services of the target; on the other hand, a market competitor may
have the opposite view. In reality, attacker payoffs may be influ-
enced by several endogenous factors that determine his or her true
preference; for example, an attacker may value success of attack
more than impact of attack, i.e. prefers to select a strategy that
yields the highest chances of success despite low consequences
over a strategy with low probability of success but that delivers
catastrophic impact [19]. These considerations are often reported
in the risk analysis literature, but seldom considered in the cyberse-
curity field, where the ‘technical’ perspective oftentimes overcomes
considerations on attacker skills, goals, and capabilities.
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